COMMITTEE ON FACULTY WELFARE
Analysis of the UCSC Faculty Salary Merit Boost Plan

To the Academic Senate, Santa Cruz Division:

Executive Summary:

A 3-year modification of academic personnel merit-based salary actions (the merit boost plan) was initiated in academic year 2008-2009, and recently extended for an additional 3 years. The goal of this plan, according to the Senate-Administrative Task Force Report[1] is to increase median faculty salary at UCSC to the systemwide (9-campus) median.

CFW has undertaken a review of this effort, assessing the level of access, impact and cost of the plan over the first three years. The main conclusions from our analysis are:

1) Changes in merit review practices have had a mostly positive impact on faculty salaries, but there is some evidence that suggests that at least some faculty have received a lower benefit than they might have experienced under previous rules.
2) Roughly speaking, about half of the faculty undergoing review each year have benefited from the plan.
3) The incremental cost of the merit-boost plan has been relatively modest, having accumulated to about $250,000/yr, which corresponds to the difference in total merit-based salary increases in 2010-2011 relative to those in 2007-2008.

Background:

In academic year 2008-2009 UCSC initiated a 3-year plan of modified academic personnel merit-based salary recommendations (the "Merit Boost Plan"). This effort was motivated by statistical comparisons of faculty salaries across UC campuses, which indicated that UCSC median salary was $6100 less than systemwide median salary, and that UCSC median off-scale salaries were lower than the median of "comparable" UC campuses (i.e., excluding UCB and UCLA) at all ranks other than Associate professor (by $3944 for Assistant Professors, and $700 for Full Professors), with increasing deficit relative to both 7-campus and 9-campus measures for higher percentiles of the distribution of off-scale salaries for each rank and step.

Numerous discussions by Senate committees and the administration were conducted pertaining to the significance of these comparative statistics; however, it is fair to state that comprehensive understanding of the root causes of UCSC's low position in both median salary and off-scale salary metrics was never achieved. Various campus practices were proposed as possible contributing factors, including UCSC preference to award accelerations rather than to tolerate very large off-scale salaries, UCSC use of overlapping steps that are not universally used at other campuses, UCSC decisions regarding base salary levels for computing cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) allocations, and conservatism of the UCSC merit evaluation system, among other candidate factors. Differences in academic personnel practices between campuses certainly

[1] http://senate.ucsc.edu/archives/faculty-salaries/FacultySalary%20TaskForce%20Final%20ReportwCharts.pdf

complicate comparisons, but most assessments suggested that UCSC faculty salaries lag behind other UC campuses to a significant degree.

It was decided that a remedy should be undertaken, and this resulted in a 3-year modification of academic personnel merit-based salary actions. Two goals were established by the 2008 Senate-Administration Task Force on Faculty Salaries: (1) by July 1, 2009, UCSC's median dollars off-scale were to equal that of the next lowest UC campus, and (2) by July 1, 2011, UCSC's median faculty salary was to equal the UC systemwide 9-campus median.

The implementation guidelines for the merit-based salary action plan, as articulated in a memo by EVC Galloway dated May 31, 2011 (see Appendix A), are as follows:

- Greater-than-normal files that are closer to a normal action should be considered for a one-step advancement plus an additional off-scale component equivalent to a half-step.
- Greater-than-normal files that are closer to an acceleration, but which do not quite demonstrate outstanding performance in all three areas, should be considered for a one-step advancement plus an additional off-scale component equivalent to $100 less than the next step.
- Accelerations to steps below Professor, Step 6, should be considered for an additional off-scale salary component, typically equivalent to a half-step.
- Based on the recommendation of the task force, salary practices for acceleration to Professor, Steps 6-9 and Above Scale, as well as to further Above Scale, remain unchanged.

Hence, the new guidelines created new categories of "boosted" merit increases that should achieve progressively higher median off-scale salaries and higher median salaries. These categories are designed to address issues identified with UCSC's comparative statistics. To clarify the differences between the pre-2008 practices and the guidelines for the merit boost plan, Table 1 presents a comparison of the modifiers used by the Academic Personnel Office to qualify merit review cases and their outcomes.

	Qualifier	Increment Pre 2008	Increment Merit Boost Plan
Accelerations	**A1**	Did not exist	2.50
	AC	2.00	2.00
Greater than normal merit increases	**G2**	Did not exist	1.90
	G1	Did not exist	1.50
	GR	Range of 1.00-1.90 (most often 1.50)	Range of 1.00-1.90 but not G1 or G2
Regular merit increases	**No qualifier**	1.00	1.00
	SI	< 1.0	< 1.0

Table 1. Modifiers used by the Academic Personnel Office to qualify Promotion and Merit cases.

The decision to link the UCSC faculty salary boost effort to merit reviews implicitly recognized that:

1) Not all faculty members would benefit from the program (because they were not reviewed during the 3-year program, their merit case was insufficient to be boosted

relative to past practice, or their rank and step were in a range where no boost effort was adopted).

2) It would take several years of implementation to close the gap in overall salary outlay relative to other campuses, particularly as other campuses may undertake parallel efforts to increase salaries.
3) The goal was to correct salaries looking forward, not to correct any real or perceived historical inequity at the individual faculty level. This was done under the assumption that other mechanisms (e.g., the equity review process) are available for the latter purpose.

It was also explicitly recognized that the particular mechanism adopted to achieve the merit boost was directly at odds with the then widely-discussed notion of re-baselining the salary scales and reducing off-scale amounts across UC (as commenced in the October 2007 systemwide salary adjustment).

CFW goals:

Now that the 3-year program has been completed, and a decision has been made to extend the program for a second 3-year interval, CFW has compiled statistical information on some outcomes of the effort. CFW recognizes that not all faculty have yet been reviewed (some due to being on a 4-year review cycle that bracketed 2008-2011; some having deferred review; some having been very recently hired and not yet reviewed), but we believe that evaluation of the program at this stage is important, particularly in light of current system-wide developments around merit-based salary increase allocations and cost-of-living (COLA) adjustments. This report is part of a series of papers that investigate faculty salaries at UCSC and the metrics used for comparisons against other campuses.

The effects of the conscious change in UCSC merit salary decisions can be evaluated using various metrics. Acting upon a recommendation of the 2008 Task Force, for the past three years the Academic Personnel Office has generated annual reports that focus on average and median off-scale salaries (see Appendix B). These reports show that salaries have been affected in the expected direction, moving UCSC somewhat closer to the UC median salary and median off-scale level at most ranks and steps (but not at the level of Professor, steps 1 to 5). The first task force objective was achieved, but the second was not, in part due to parallel faculty salary augmentation initiatives undertaken by other campuses. To limit duplication of effort, CFW has focused on alternative measures; in particular, CFW has focused on the following aspects of the plan:

- *Access*: How many faculty members have had access to potential benefits of the plan? Are there individuals who have not benefitted from the plan in any way?
- *Impact on merit reviews*: What has the pattern of normal, greater-than-normal and accelerations been under the merit boost plan? How is this pattern different from the past?
- *Cost*: What has been the incremental cost to the campus from implementing the merit-boost plan?

Data:

We are very grateful to Assistant Vice Chancellor Peterson and the APO staff for providing us with access to the data used for this analysis. The data consist of demographic information such as department of affiliation, salary scale (regular vs. business, economics and engineering; fiscal year vs. academic year) along with salary, off-scale increment, step, rank and outcome of successful review process (if any happened) for each faculty who was employed on campus on July 1st of the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The data did not include names or gender/ethnicity information to safeguard the privacy of the faculty. For the same reason, when results are displayed at the department level, we have excluded units with two or fewer affiliates.

Results:

Access: Among the 508 faculty who were continuously employed by the campus during the 3-year merit boost plan (between July 1st, 2008 and July 1st, 2011), 79 (15.5%) faculty were not reviewed, 340 (67%) faculty were reviewed once, 86 (16.9%) faculty were reviewed twice, and 3 faculty were reviewed 3 times. Table 2 presents the distribution of reviews over departments; these values are represented graphically in Figure 1. Most departments had a high proportion of faculty undergoing review only once during this period (nominal review intervals are every 2 years for Assistant and Associate Professors in non-overlapping steps and 3 years for Professors I-V; all faculty must be reviewed within 6 year intervals). However, there is a great deal of variability across departments. For example, some departments such as BME, POLI, PHIL and AMST had a high proportion of faculty undergoing two reviews, while departments such as CMPE, ELE, ASTR and HISC had a relatively high proportion of faculty who did not undergo any review during this period. This is likely due to the differences in rank across departments.

Overall, the differences in access across departments seem to be driven mostly by the distribution of ranks in each department, which is also highly variable (see Figure 2 and Table 3). For example, departments in the Physical and Biological Sciences Division (black labels in Figure 2) tend to have relatively high percentages of Full Professors, and a corresponding tendency to have had faculty with 1 review in the 3-year period (black labels in Figure 1). The association between number of reviews and rank is statistically significant (p-value < 0.00001).

Impact: The percentage of greater-than-normal salary increases that included an off-scale component but no acceleration **increased** from an average of 25.3% in the three-year period 2005-2008 to an average of 46.6% during the three-year merit boost plan period 2008-2011. Salary increases with no step advance or a single step advance **decreased** from an average of 43.2% from 2005-2008 to 33.5% from 2008-2011. These trends are in-line with the stated goals of the program. However, the number of accelerations also **decreased** from an average of 31.6% from 2005-2008 to an average of 19.8% from 2008-2011 (this decrease was particularly prevalent for assistant professors and full professors 6-A). These observed difference are statistically significant (p-value < 0.000001 in all cases). The annual values are shown in Figure 3; note that to facilitate comparisons with previous years we have collapsed all accelerations under the merit boost plan into a single category, and we have done the same for all greater-than-normal reviews. The histograms indicate that even though many faculty members have clearly benefited by receiving off-scale increments (or larger off-scale increments) beyond what they

would have received under previous practice, at least some might have been negatively impacted due to receiving a G2 merit increase rather than an acceleration. *While there has been no explicit change in the criteria that UCSC follows for providing an acceleration, this could be a consequence of having a greater number of standard salary increments to select from and/or an unintended consequence from an explicit focus on increasing average off-scale salary levels.*

To better understand the impact of the merit boost plan, Table 4 presents a breakdown of all positive merit review cases during the 2009-2011 period. Note that use of the legacy GR category has been steadily decreasing over this period, but use of accelerations without any additional salary increase (the legacy AC category) has seen somewhat of an increase.

Table 5 presents a breakdown of the merit review outcomes across departments, both for the period of the merit boost plan and for the three years before. Again, there is a lot of variability across units. Departments such as LANG, POLI, ENG, ARTD and EDUC experienced increased numbers of successful reviews that involved some sort of boost. On the other hand, departments such as EEB, ETOX, ENVS and HISC actually saw decreases in the number of reviews with greater-than-normal outcomes. In addition, Figures 4 and 5 present graphical displays of the department-level outcomes, providing further demonstration of the trade-off in allocation of accelerations versus G2 merits: generally speaking, the introduction of the G2 category appears to have somewhat reduced the number of both accelerations and regular merit increase, while increasing the number of reviews that included some sort of off-scale component.

Cost: Table 6 presents the total cost to the campus of the salary increases associated with the merit review process (these values exclude retention cases). The cost for each faculty was computed as the difference between the total salaries on July 1st of two consecutive years. To achieve a fair comparison, the effect of COLA increases was first removed for the 2006-2007 and the 2007-2008 periods. Generally speaking, the per-faculty cost has been steadily increasing, particularly during the 2008-2011 period, with a total merit-based salary increment about $250,000 higher in 2010-2011 than in 2007-2008. *This is most likely a consequence of the merit boost plan. However, one must also allow for the (probably small) effect of the relative aging of the faculty due to a very low hiring rate during the last three years (the campus went from recruiting between 31 and 33 new faculty each year between 2006 and 2008 to recruiting an average of 11 faculty per year during the 2009-2011 period). Indeed, even though the pace of retirements has accelerated over the last three years (the campus went from 32 retirements in the 2005-2007 period to 43 in the 2008-2010 period), it is clear from the data that the proportion of junior faculty has decreased. To provide some context, by July 1st, 2011, only 88 faculty out of 542 (16%) were assistant professors, which is a decrease from 2006, when they represented 23% of the faculty*

Discussion:

Changes in salary increase practice have had mostly positive, but somewhat mixed effects on faculty salaries. The results here and in the APO salary reports suggest that the modified merit review practices have positively impacted UCSC faculty salaries overall. Not all of the changes were positive and some were probably not foreseen during the design of the plan. Decreasing the number of merit reviews that did not provide any greater-than-normal salary was an implicit goal

of the merit boost plan that has been achieved. The reduction of the number of accelerations however, was not an explicit goal of the plan, but appears to have occurred due to standardization of the previously infrequently used G2-level increase. Our analysis suggests that some individuals who received a G2 modified merit increase during the last three years would likely have received a full acceleration under the previous practices. Quantifying how many faculty fall into this category is difficult, but a simple calculation that involves multiplying the average number of faculty under review each year (170) by the average reduction in the number of accelerations (11.8%) suggests that about 20 faculty per year may have been negatively impacted by the new policy. Some caveats are in order:

1) The impact of the merit boost plan on this subset of faculty is relatively minor. In terms of salary, the difference between a regular acceleration and a G2 increase is only $100. On the other hand, the lack of the extra step advance impacts the time faculty spend at each rank and the need to use overlapping steps and/or salary increases. This could actually be beneficial to some faculty members, as it may allow time to accumulate sufficient portfolio to ease promotion and it may space out time between external letter solicitations (notably for Professor VI). As long as the campus continues its recent practice of applying COLAs to the full salary, not just to the on-scale portion of the salary (as had been done in the past), there will not be increasing impact of the difference in merit action over time.

2) In the long term, the tendency to allocate G2 increases rather than accelerations may still prove beneficial for highly productive faculty members. Although multiple successive accelerations were quite uncommon under the previous system, it is reasonable to expect that receiving multiple successive G2 merit increases will become more common, if the new procedures are sustained. This issue should be monitored in future years.

Although the impact of this shift in practice is relatively minor for individual faculty, it is important to note that it directly impacts the use of off-scale salaries as a measure of progress for the merit-boost plan. Indeed, the fact that 20 or so faculty members each year received G2 rather than accelerations enhances the campus comparison off-scale metrics, at the cost of slowing down the rate at which faculty move up the scale. This might partly explain why UCSC still lags other UC campuses in terms of total salaries even though median off-scale salaries have moved toward the systemwide median off-scale salaries.

Another issue to consider is the fact that, amongst accelerations, there has been a progressive shift from more A1 to more AC actions over the three-year period. This is puzzling given the desire to differentiate the G2 action from acceleration by more than $100 in salary, and is particularly disconcerting for promotion (PR) cases, as the EVC guidelines suggested that regular accelerations should have been most common for full professors being promoted to Step 6 or above. *A possible explanation is that, <u>in spite of efforts by CAP and the EVC to ensure a uniform application of the criteria for acceleration</u>, there may be* confusion in some units as to what recommendation is 'standard', and given the relatively large salary increases involved in acceleration, there may be a tendency to default on the AC recommendation. Another speculation is that because, at a minimum, acceleration involves a full step salary increase plus the stature of a extra step on the scale, there may have been some reluctance, or inattention, to the inclusion of the additional half-step salary increase. Relatively small numbers of faculty are

involved, so many factors could influence the trend, but it is contrary to the EVC reference actions and this issue should be monitored, with annual clarification of the rationale for the augmented acceleration practice. Expanded communication at the level of Deans and departments could also be helpful in dealing with this phenomenon.

A significant number of faculty have not yet benefited from the merit boost plan: Based on the values in Table 1 and our discussion about the effect on accelerations, it is apparent that no less than 44% and no more than 63% of the faculty reviewed and not undergoing retention offers each year have benefited from the merit boost plan. The upper limit excludes faculty members receiving regular accelerations (AC) and those receiving a regular merit increase, whereas the lower limit also excludes faculty receiving a legacy GR increase and the 60 faculty we have identified as receiving a GR2 instead of an acceleration. There was no explicit target for the plan in terms of number of faculty that might benefit, so it is not clear whether this number, an outcome of the meritocracy, can be considered a success or not. However it does appear to CFW that, in absolute terms, the number of faculty benefiting from the merit boost plan has been approximately 50%, which might tend to undermine overall faculty support for the plan. However, given the expectation that not all faculty would directly benefit, and that preference would be directed to junior faculty, this non-uniform boost is an expected consequence of the modified merit-based decision making. UCSC needs to pay attention to the increasing short-fall of median salaries at the full professor level relative to systemwide medians, as this rank has structurally had the least access to benefits of the merit boost plan.

The incremental cost of the merit boost plan to the campus has been modest: The incremental cost of the merit boost plan was computed as the difference in the average per-faculty cost of the merit review process multiplied by the average number of faculty who underwent reviews during the 2008-2011 period. Under that measure, the amount of money invested in the merit boost plan is about $250,000 per year, a relatively modest but ongoing amount. After three years of the merit boost plan, this translates into a cumulative ongoing cost of about $750,000. If we use instead the difference between the highest per-faculty increase in the 2009-2011 period and the lowest per-faculty increase in the 2006-2008 period, the incremental cost goes up to slightly under $450,000 per year.

To place these numbers in context, note that the Joint Faculty Salary Task Force report of 2008 estimated that to increase the median dollars off-scale from $3400 to the 7-campus median of $6100 would require $2700 x 532 faculty = $1.44M per year. Because shifting the median actually requires only half of the population to increase, the lower bound on necessary funding is $720,000 per year. On the other hand, the median salary gap relative to the systemwide average was $6100 in 2008, and it would require a minimum increment of $1.62M per year to close that gap (the primary goal of the salary increase effort). These are substantial sums, and clearly exceed the investment made thus far during the UCSC merit boost plan. Assessment of the status relative to achieving the goal of matching the 9-campus median salary must be conducted annually, and further adjustments may need to be made to the Merit Boost Plan if convergence is not anticipated over a reasonable time frame.

	Number of Reviews		
	0	1	2
AMSD	0%	82%	18%
AMST	0%	50%	50%
ANTH	17%	67%	17%
ARTD	0%	70%	30%
ASTR	30%	61%	9%
BME	11%	44%	44%
CHEM	9%	82%	9%
CMMU	0%	67%	33%
CMPE	41%	53%	6%
CMPS	18%	59%	23%
EART	11%	63%	26%
ECON	17%	48%	35%
EDUC	19%	56%	25%
EEB	12%	88%	0%
ELE	38%	54%	8%
ENG	25%	50%	25%
ENVS	13%	73%	13%
ETOX	14%	57%	29%
FILM	8%	58%	33%
FMST	33%	50%	17%
HAVC	0%	78%	22%
HISC	33%	67%	0%
HIST	24%	52%	24%
LALS	22%	67%	11%
LANG	0%	50%	50%
LING	18%	82%	0%
LIT	21%	79%	0%
MATH	21%	79%	0%
MCDB	9%	73%	18%
MUSC	29%	50%	21%
OCEA	12%	88%	0%
PHIL	0%	57%	43%
PHYS	0%	90%	10%
POLI	0%	55%	45%
PSYC	9%	78%	13%
SOCY	0%	87%	13%
THEA	18%	73%	9%

Table 2. Departmental distribution of the number of reviews for faculty continuously employed on campus between July 1st, 2008 and July 1st, 2011.



Figure 1. Proportion of faculty undergoing 0, 1, and 2 reviews on each department between 2008 and 2011. For these ternary diagrams, proximity to an apex indicates higher percentage of individuals with that value (ranging from 0% on the line segment joining the other two apexes to 100% at the apex). Thus the Physics department (PHYS) had 90% of the faculty reviewed once, 10% twice, and 0% three times. Astronomy and Astrophysics (ASTR) had 60% of the faculty reviewed once, 10% twice, and 30% not reviewed. Precise values are given in Table 2.



Figure 2. Proportion of faculty on each rank by July 1st, 2009.

	Rank as of July 1st 2009			
Number of reviews	Assistant	Associate	Full 1- 5	Full 6-A
0	1	10	27	41
1	53	66	131	91
2	51	28	4	3
3	3	0	0	0

Table 3. Number of reviews per faculty at different ranks.



	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
AC	56	64	45	30	42	37
GR	39	54	39	83	90	84
SI / 1 Step	70	65	90	74	61	50
	165	183	174	187	193	171

Figure 3. Distribution of merit-review outcomes between 2006 and 2011.

			2009		2010		2011		
			W/O Retention	*Retention*	*W/O Retention*	*Retention*	*W/O Retention*	*Retention*	*Did the faculty in this category benefit from the boost plan?*
SI	GR	≤1.0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Possibly
	Increase	<1.0	10	4	8	7	11	8	No impact likely
MI	A1	2.5	8	0	14	0	6	0	Yes, was rare before
	AC	2.0	5	0	7	2	12	1	No impact likely
	G2	1.9	20	1	36	1	34	3	Likely, but some $100 less
	G1	1.5	31	0	29	0	30	0	Possibly
	GR	1.0-1.9	20	0	8	3	5	1	Unknown
	1 Step	1.0	57	0	42	1	28	1	No impact likely
PR	A1	2.5	9	0	5	0	6	0	Yes, was rare before
	AC	2.0	8	0	12	2	9	3	No impact likely
	G2	1.9	4	0	8	0	4	0	Likely, but some $100 less
	G1	1.5	4	0	1	0	5	1	Possibly
	GR	1.0-1.9	1	1	3	0	0	1	Unknown
	1 Step	1.0	3	0	3	0	2	0	No impact likely
Total			181	6	177	16	152	19	

Table 4. Detailed outcome of review process during the three years covered by the merit boost plan. SI corresponds to a Salary Increase that does not affect rank or step, PR corresponds to a promotion case that affects both rank and step, and MI corresponds to a merit increase that affects the step but not the rank.

	2006-2008			2009-2011			
Dept	AC	GR	SI / 1 Step	AC	GR	SI / 1 Step	Increase in AC+GR during 3-year plan
LANG	NA	NA	NA	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	NA
POLI	14.3%	21.4%	64.3%	23.5%	64.7%	11.8%	52.5%
ENG	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%	41.7%
ARTD	7.1%	35.7%	57.1%	7.7%	76.9%	15.4%	41.7%
EDUC	15.0%	10.0%	75.0%	5.3%	57.9%	36.8%	38.2%
ANTH	25.0%	12.5%	62.5%	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%	37.5%
LIT	30.0%	20.0%	50.0%	34.8%	52.2%	13.0%	37.0%
ELE	45.5%	9.1%	45.5%	22.2%	66.7%	11.1%	34.4%
MATH	41.2%	0.0%	58.8%	16.7%	58.3%	25.0%	33.8%
CHEM	34.8%	17.4%	47.8%	18.2%	59.1%	22.7%	25.1%
FMST	12.5%	25.0%	62.5%	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%	22.5%
FILM	12.5%	50.0%	37.5%	18.8%	62.5%	18.8%	18.7%
LALS	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%	17.9%
CMMU	30.0%	30.0%	40.0%	11.1%	66.7%	22.2%	17.8%
SOCY	38.5%	7.7%	53.8%	26.3%	36.8%	36.8%	17.0%
HAVC	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	15.4%	61.5%	23.1%	16.9%
BME	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	23.1%	53.8%	23.1%	16.9%
PHIL	33.3%	0.0%	66.7%	8.3%	41.7%	50.0%	16.7%
LING	55.6%	22.2%	22.2%	20.0%	70.0%	10.0%	12.2%
AMSD	15.4%	53.8%	30.8%	21.4%	57.1%	21.4%	9.4%
CMPE	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	25.0%	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%
ASTR	52.6%	15.8%	31.6%	33.3%	38.1%	28.6%	3.0%
CMPS	50.0%	19.2%	30.8%	33.3%	37.5%	29.2%	1.6%
MCDB	42.1%	21.1%	36.8%	24.0%	40.0%	36.0%	0.8%
ECON	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	6.3%	31.3%	62.5%	-2.5%
OCEA	27.3%	27.3%	45.5%	12.5%	37.5%	50.0%	-4.5%
PSYC	11.1%	48.1%	40.7%	20.8%	33.3%	45.8%	-5.1%
MUSC	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%	7.7%	61.5%	30.8%	-5.8%
HIST	11.8%	35.3%	52.9%	9.1%	31.8%	59.1%	-6.2%
PHYS	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%	9.1%	45.5%	45.5%	-8.0%
EART	52.6%	26.3%	21.1%	26.1%	43.5%	30.4%	-9.3%
AMST	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	11.1%	44.4%	44.4%	-11.1%
THEA	71.4%	14.3%	14.3%	18.2%	54.5%	27.3%	-13.0%
EEB	38.9%	27.8%	33.3%	35.3%	11.8%	52.9%	-19.6%
ETOX	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	12.5%	50.0%	37.5%	-20.8%
ENVS	53.8%	38.5%	7.7%	26.7%	33.3%	40.0%	-32.3%
HISC	83.3%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	-50.0%

Table 5. Outcomes of the merit review processes by department.



Figure 4. Outcomes of the merit-review process during 2006-2008, by department. Most departments tend to fall close to the bottom edge, which indicates a tendency for acceleration or 1 step advances.



Figure 5. Outcomes of the merit-review process over the 2009-2011, by department. Most departments tend to fall close to the right edge, which means greater than normal increases have dominated over accelerations.

	Review period	*Total cost of merit-based salary increases*	*Number of Faculty*	*Mean*	*Median increase*
Pre- Merit-Boost Plan	06-07	1,327,880	170	7,811.06	5,800.00
	07-08	1,218,920	162	7,524.20	6,100.00
Merit-Boost Plan	08-09	1,477,700	177	8,348.60	7,000.00
	09-10	1,583,800	174	9,102.30	6,500.00
	10-11	1,461,200	147	9,940.14	8,500.00

Table 6. Cost of the merit-review system.

Respectfully submitted,

COMMITTEE ON FACULTY WELFARE
Noriko Aso
Carlos Dobkin
Gina Langhout
Thorne Lay
Abel Rodriquez
Gustavo Vasquez
Matthew Wolf-Meyer
Suresh Lodha, Chair Helene Moglen, ex officio

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