CPB Report to the Senate: 2.21.01 (R. Meister)

Introduction

The resolution before you asks simply that the Senate have an opportunity to deliberate and vote on a major growth-related issue facing our campus, the curricular component of the Silicon Valley Center. I want to begin by asking why this rather simple proposal has become so controversial. The reason, I think, is that the Senate and the Administration have been traditionally suspicious of each other’s strategy toward growth in ways that have made cooperative planning difficult. On the one hand, we in the Senate frequently suspect that the administration’s strategy is merely to meet or exceed OP’s expectations on enrollment in the hope that further resources will follow. The Administration, on the other hand, tends to suspect that any questions about growth from the Senate imply the threat of a moratorium unless we get all the resources we want. CPB is here to tell you (we have been trying to tell you for the past year) that neither of these strategies can be successful because both are, at their root, unprincipled — that neither strategy is useful except for the purpose of caricaturing each others’ positions, and that no one actually wishes to limit UCSC’s ability to serve a growing number of students at UC standards.

The purpose of today’s resolution is to call for the initiation of a more principled dialogue about growth between the Senate and the Administration based on a new metric of analysis. In the developing this new metric, we believe, the faculty can no longer avoid discussing the underlying dilemma that has been present since our new enrollment targets were announced 18 months ago. We can state the dilemma as follows: If UCSC does not continue to grow, we are likely to be relegated to second-tier status in the UC system when requesting capital resources; if, however, we accept the enrollment increases projected over the next five years with the capital resources available, we will remain at the bottom of UC’s second tier capitalization per student. Neither refusing growth, nor embracing it are in themselves adequate strategies for improving our position vis à vis systemwide norms.

Analysis

This statement of the dilemma is based on three facts of which you may be unaware: (1) The eight UC campuses entered Tidal Wave II with large disparities in assignable space per student; (2) OP’s assignment of additional enrollments to each campus has not taken adequate account of these initial disparities, and does not include an effective plan for reducing them; (3) UCSC entered Tidal Wave II at the bottom of the UC system — far below the other campuses — and is projected to fall even further behind by the time we reach 15,000 students.

Chart I shows that this campus entered Tidal Wave II with capital resources of c. 80.8% of the minimum allowable CPEC space per student. To put this in perspective, the next lowest campus started out at 86.8%, and all of the others were higher. Please note that by 2005 no other campus (with the arguable exception of UCSD) will have fallen significantly below where we were at the beginning of Tidal Wave II. We, however, will have fallen an additional 9.2% below CPEC’s standard. In contrast, UC as a whole will have declined only 7.6%. Riverside, which is taking the lion’s share of the enrollments, will end up approximately where we started out.
Chart II shows the growing gap between the space resources per student at UCSC and the UC average. The existence and expansion of this gap is not a matter of speculation – all of the UC campuses are already committed to the enrollment growth that is charted here, and UC will build no capital projects that are not already reflected in the space online projected by 2006-07. We must further call your attention to the likelihood that the true comparative figures are much worse for our campus than Chart II shows because the systemwide average does not include data from UCLA, which is one of the largest and most richly-resourced campuses in the system. When the UCLA data becomes available, the systemwide average of assignable space per student is likely to be significantly larger than it appears to be in Chart II. You should remember, moreover, the systemwide data Chart II does include UCSC. Were UCSC to be excluded from the systemwide average, the gap between this campus (considered separately) and all of the others would be even larger.

Now that you have this basic information, CPB would like to make three general points about its relevance for campus planning.

1. The first general point concerns the problem of undercapitalization that we on CPB have come to call "the gap". Our point is simple: Long-range planning cannot be based solely on the need to maximize operational revenues by taking as many additional students as the state will fund. We must also look at the impact of enrollment growth on the gap, as illustrated in Chart II. What is needed for the purpose of campus planning is a principled metric for phasing in higher enrollments in a way that is at least gap-neutral, and preferably gap reducing. How can we increase our operational revenues by adding students without going even further into the hole with respect to our capital resources per student? Foregrounding this question would create a new discourse about planning on our campus, and would require that our campus to take the lead in advancing of this discourse in systemwide discussions. Unless such a discourse takes hold, UCSC will be so far in the hole by the time our ten-year plans are ready that their implementation will be severely constrained by the size of the gap that must be overcome.

2. Our second general point about campus planning is that the gap that I have just described was caused in part by what CPB has come to call "the lag." The first two bar graphs on Chart III show that, at the end of the current five-year period of growth, UCSC will fall even further below the CPEC standard for space per student. One reason for this decline in the years 2001-2006 is that UCSC neither expected nor planned for curricular and physical growth in 1995-2000, the five year interval that precedes the information shown on Chart III. Capital funding in UC, however, is essentially in a five year pipeline – nothing comes out that wasn’t put in five years earlier. Chart III shows the consequence of absorbing our entire 20-year expectation of growth between 2000-2006 without having sufficient plans in place to phase in capital development during this period. This planning lag has meant that our resource gap will have grown significantly deeper by 2006-7, when we reach our LRDP cap of 15K students. [Chart III]

3. Our third general point is that under the 10-year planning scenario set forth by Provost Simpson, the lag is likely to grow. The current timetable for 10-year academic planning will not provide a justification for new capital projects until sometime in 2003, at the earliest. Once capital needs are identified, environmental site work will have to be done before a proposed project can be approved and placed...
in the pipeline. At last December’s capital planning Retreat, the most optimistic projection was that the buildings needed to accommodate present growth will not be ready until well after 2010-2011 – the year in which Chart III ends. From the perspective of an ordinary faculty member, this means that the normal lag between higher enrollments and capital has increased from a time scale corresponding roughly to one or two personnel actions to the half-life of an academic career.

Chart III can be read to illustrate the effects of an ever-growing lag. The decline between the present and 2006-7 reflects the shortfall of capital projects now in the pipeline during the present period of rapidly accelerating growth to 15,000 student FTE. The further drop-off shown between 2006-7 and 2010-11 is hypothetical, inasmuch as it assumes no new capital projects during the intervening period. The point of projecting out to 2010-11 is to indicate the effect of the growing lag in campus planning on the gap in campus resources. Associate Vice-Chancellor Mike Michaels estimates that about $89M in new capital projects would have to be completed in 2005-2010 in order for enrollment growth from 15,000 to 16,900 students to be gap-neutral. If we are to build this space in time, fundable proposals for major new capital projects will need to leave this campus in the next 2-3 years.

The Resolution

What is the relation of the foregoing analysis to the proposed resolution before you? The answer is simple. Now is the time to know whether the Silicon Valley is simply an attractive possibility that we might pursue under any growth scenario, or whether we should continue to talk about it as the interim solution to the growth that is already upon us. If the SVC is not that interim solution, then we must begin planning to accommodate those students elsewhere. But we cannot make plans to accommodate these students elsewhere if we are simultaneously telling OP that we expect to handle them in Santa Clara Valley. By failing to plan realistically for Silicon Valley we are, in effect, increasing the lag in planning on this campus, which means that the plans that we eventually produce will need to overcome an ever-larger gap. The effects of a growing lag on a growing gap will be felt by students who can no longer be told that the lack of resources is temporary; it will also be felt by faculty, as we try to make an estimated 700 competitive hires during a ten year period in which our assignable office and research space could fall below 60% of CPEC’s allowable standards for a UC. Ultimately, the effect could well be an overall decline in the academic quality of the campus as a whole.

Conclusion

CPB’s purpose today is nothing less than to change the discourse of long and mid-range planning to a more principled basis that can be shared with other campuses and put forward to OP as a basis for allocation of enrollment growth to the allocation of resources.

CPB believes that UC will not meet its obligations to become more accessible the citizens of California if its follows a path which, intentionally or not, places UCSC permanently at the bottom of the second tier of institutions that carry the UC label. There is certainly some risk in raising this issue, but as UC faculty members, we must believe that the Regents would not want to create a second tier of UC quality, and that the Legislature would not be willing to pay extra dollars to send a student to UC if there were two tiers of UC quality. After a full year of trying to discuss this problem
the Senate floor, we now call upon Senate and the Administration to acknowledge and build upon
their valid differences in perspective, to think strategically, and and to start developing a discourse
about growth in which the preservation of quality has operative meaning.

In raising these issues today, CPB is simply following its charge under the Senate Bylaws, which
requires it to advise the administration and the Senate about all resource questions affecting the
academic curriculum. Our advice is that the good news about growth raises questions about the
maintenance of quality that need to be directly addressed in the campus planning process.

Charts

The following charts are based on numbers that are still under revision at OP. These are, however,
the numbers that are currently available for planning purposes, and we believe that the relative
magnitudes and the directions of change are presently relevant for both campuswide and systemwide
discussions.

Chart I.

Current, Planned, and Estimated Future Space Relative to CPEC Guidelines
Chart II.
UC Space Inventory
Comparison to CPEC Guidelines

Actual

Projected in Draft 2001-6 Space Tables
Note: UC average excludes UCLA.

UCSC
•• UC avg

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%